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Post-processing of the oblivious key in quantum private queries
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Quantum private query (QPQ) is a kind of quantum protocols to protect both users’ privacy
in their communication. There is an interesting example, that is, Alice wants to buy one item
from Bob’s database, which is composed of a quantity of valuable messages. QPQ protocol is the
communication procedure ensuring that Alice can get only one item from Bob, and at the same
time, Bob cannot know which one was taken by Alice. Owing to its practicability, quantum-key-
distribution-based QPQ has draw much attention in recent years. However, the post-processing
of the key in such protocols, called oblivious key, remains far from being satisfactorily known.
Especially, the error correction method for such special key is still missing. Here we focus on
the post-processing of the oblivious key, including both dilution and error correction. On the one
hand, we demonstrate that the previous dilution method, which greatly reduces the communication
complexity, will bring Alice the chance to illegally obtain much additional information about Bob’s
database. Simulations show that by very limited queries Alice can obtain the whole database.
On the other hand, we present an effective error-correction method for the oblivious key, which
completes its post-processing and makes such QPQ more practical.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
In some cryptographic communications, we need not
only protect the security of the transmitted message
against eavesdropping from an outside adversary, but
also the communicators’ individual privacy against each
other. An interesting example is the problem of pri-
vate user queries to a database, where Alice bought an
item in Bob’s database, which is composed of a quan-
tity of valuable messages, and wants to get it from Bob
(given that Alice knows the address of this item in the
database). Here Bob will worry about that Alice can
obtain more items from his database when she gets the
bought one, and Alice might not want Bob know which
item she is querying. Symmetrically private information
retrieval (SPIR) [1] protocols are designed for such cir-
cumstance. It ensures the privacies of both Alice and
Bob. That is, after the communication, Alice can cor-
rectly obtain at most one item (i.e. the one who bought)
from Bob’s database and simultaneously, Bob does not
know the address Alice has retrieved.
As we know, the security of most classical cryptosys-
tems is based on the assumptions of computational com-
plexity, and they might be broken by the strong ability
of some advanced algorithms like quantum computation
[2, 3]. Fortunately, this difficulty can be overcome by
quantum cryptography [4, 5], where the security is as-
sured by physical principles. Owing to its higher secu-
rity, quantum cryptography has attracted a great deal of
attention now.
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Quantum Private Queries (QPQ) is the quantum
scheme for SPIR problem. In fact, as a kind of proto-
cols for two party quantum secure computations, the task
of SPIR cannot be achieved ideally even in its quantum
version [6]. More practically, the requirements are gen-
erally relaxed into that Alice can elicit sufficiently little
content of the database, and Bob’s attack will be discov-
ered, with a certain probability, by Alice if he tries to
obtain the address Alice is retrieving.
In 2008 V. Giovannetti et al proposed the first QPQ
protocol [7–9], where the database is represented by a
unitary operation (i.e. oracle operation) and it is per-
formed on the two coming query states. In 2011 L.
Olejnik presented an improved protocol where only one
query state is necessary [10]. Compared with the pre-
vious (classical) SPIR schemes, the above two protocols
display an exponential reduction in both communication
complexity and running-time computational complexity.
Though the above two protocols exhibit significant ad-
vantages in theory, they are difficult to implement be-
cause when large database is concerned the dimension
of the oracle operation will be very high. To solve this
problem, M. Jakobi et al gave a new QPQ protocol (J-
protocol) based on quantum key distribution (QKD) [11].
In this protocol SARG04 QKD scheme [12] is utilized to
distribute an oblivious key between Alice and Bob, which
satisfies the following three requirements.
R1. Bob knows every bit in the key.
R2. Alice knows every key bit with a certain probability
(e.g. 0.25 for an honest Alice in J-protocol).
R3. Bob does not know which key bits are known by
Alice.
Then the post-processing of the key is needed, which
changes the oblivious key so that it satisfies the above
requirements (R1), (R3), and a modified (R2), that is,
2R2’. Alice knows only several bits in the key (note that
the ideal case is Alice knows just one bit, but to
increase the success probability of the communica-
tion the bits obtained by Alice are generally little
more than one, e.g. 2-7 on average).
Here we call the key before and after post-processing the
Raw Oblivious Key (ROK) and the Final Oblivious key
(FOK), respectively. Obviously it is a “dilution process”
from ROK to FOK. Afterwards, if Alice knows the j-
th bit in the FOK and wants to retrieve the i-th item
in Bob’s database, she declares a shift value s = j − i
so that Bob can shift his FOK by s. At last Bob en-
crypts his database by the shifted FOK (for simplicity, it
is generally assumed that the content of each item in the
database is just a bit, and one key bit can encrypt one
item by ont-time pad), and sends the whole encrypted
database to Alice. Thus Alice can correctly decrypt the
item she wanted by her known key bit. More importantly,
both users’ privacy are successfully protected.
Compared with previous QPQ protocols, J-protocol is
based on QKD, the most practical application of quan-
tum information technology, and consequently it is easy
to be realized. More concretely, it can be easily gener-
alized to large database, and it is loss tolerant. There-
fore, as a practical model of QPQ, QKD-based QPQ is
very attractive and has become a studying point. Differ-
ent manners to distribute the ROK were given by some
of us in Refs. [13, 14], and different methods for post-
processing were presented in Refs. [15, 16].
Here we focus on the post-processing of the oblivious
key in QPQ. In Ref. [11] M. Jakobi et al gave a kN −N
method, that is, it transforms a ROK with length kN
into a N -bit FOK (here N is the total number of items
in the database and k is a parameter which is an integer
greater than 1). Afterwards M. V. Panduranga Rao et
al proposed two improved methods in Ref. [15]. One is
N−N , and the other is rM −N , where r,M are integers
satisfying rM ≪ N . Obviously these two methods would
greatly reduce the communication complexity.
However, in our opinion, two important problems
about the post-processing of the oblivious key need be
further studied.
(1) As pointed by the authors of Ref. [15], the re-
duction in communication complexity in their methods
comes at the cost that parity information about some
key bits in FOK is easier to obtain for Alice. So, the
question is, what kind of influence this fact (that is, the
parity information were illegally leaked to Alice) brings
on the database security?
(2) In a practical realization, noise exists in the chan-
nel and there are always errors in the shared key between
Alice and Bob. An error bit in Alice’s FOK implies that
Alice would pay her money and get back a wrong content
from Bob, which is obviously unfair for Alice. Moreover,
when she finds the bought content is error, Alice believes
Bob is cheating, and consequently Bob’s reputation will
become very bad. Therefore, just like in QKD, error
correction is necessary in the post-processing. In fact,
dilution and error correction compose the whole post-
processing of oblivious key in QPQ (note that privacy
amplification, another important part of post-processing
in QKD, is unnecessary here because its function will
be achieved by the dilution procedure). But performing
error correction on oblivious key is difficult. This is be-
cause, to correct errors, Bob has to declare additional
information about the key to Alice, which would bring
the chance for Alice to illegally get much more key bits
than expected. M. Jakobi et al listed error correction as
an open question in QPQ [11], and till now all previous
post-processing methods just pay attention to “dilution”,
while error correction is still awaited.
In this paper we demonstrate that M. V. Panduranga
Rao et al’s dilution methods would result in insecurity
for Bob’s database. Simulations show that Alice can ob-
tain much more items (even the whole database) than
expected if she execute multiple but limited (averagely
53.4 for N = 104) queries. In other words, buying about
53 items means obtaining the whole database with 104
items in total! Furthermore, we propose an effective
error-correctionmethod for the oblivious key, which com-
pletes its post-processing and makes such QPQ protocol
more practical for a real noisy channel.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II
we give a brief review of previous three dilution methods,
and analysis the insecurity brought by the N−N method
and the rM − N one in Sec. III. The scheme of post-
processing with error-correction is presented In Sec. IV
and Sec.V is our conclusion.
II. PREVIOUS DILUTION METHODS
In this section we will give brief sketches of previous
dilution methods, including the kN − N one given by
M. Jakobi et al [11], and the improved ones, i.e. N −N
and rM − N ones, given by M. V. Panduranga Rao et
al [15]. In all these methods it is assumed that Alice
and Bob have shared a ROK OR satisfying the above
requirements R1-R3. The aim is to dilute OR into the
FOK OF satisfying R1,R2’, and R3.
A. The kN −N method
For simplicity, the kN -bit ROK OR can be denoted as
OR1 O
R
2 ...O
R
kN , and the N -bit FOK O
F as OF1 O
F
2 ...O
F
N .
Here everyORi (1 ≤ i ≤ kN) orOFi (1 ≤ i ≤ N) represents
a key bit. In this method the relation between OR and
OF is
OFi =
k−1⊕
j=0
ORi+jN , 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (1)
where
⊕
denotes the addition modulo 2.
3For example, N = 12, k = 2, and the ROK is
0 1 1 0, 0 1 0 0, 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1, 0 1 0 1, 1 0 0 1 (2)
for Bob, while
? 1 ? ?, 0 ? ? ?, ? 1 ? ?
0 ? ? ?, ? 1 ? ?, ? 0 ? ? (3)
for Alice (that is, Alice only knows the 2nd, 5th, 10th,
13rd, 18th, 22nd bits in this ROK). Then after the dilu-
tion, the FOK is
0 1 0 1, 0 0 0 1, 1 1 1 0 (4)
for Bob, while
? ? ? ?, ? ? ? ?, ? 1 ? ? (5)
for Alice. It’s easy to see that the quantity of the known
bits for Alice is reduced from 6 to 1.
B. The N −N method
Similarly, the N -bit ROK OR can be denoted as
OR1 O
R
2 ...O
R
N , and the N -bit FOK O
F as OF1 O
F
2 ...O
F
N . In
this N −N method the relation between OR and OF is
OFi =
i+k−1 mod N⊕
j=i
ORj , 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (6)
For example, N = 12, k = 2, and the ROK is
0 1 1 0, 0 1 0 0, 0 1 1 1 (7)
for Bob, while
? ? ? 0, 0 ? 0 ?, ? ? ? ? (8)
for Alice. Then after the dilution, the FOK is
1 0 1 0, 1 1 0 0, 1 0 0 1 (9)
for Bob, while
? ? ? 0, ? ? ? ?, ? ? ? ? (10)
for Alice. It’s easy to see that the quantity of the known
bits for Alice is reduced from 3 to 1.
C. The rM −N method
In this method, the rM -bit ROK OR is divided into r
sub-keys with the same lengthM , i.e. OR1 , OR2 , ..., ORr .
Then the following two steps are executed.
(1) Sub-key extension. For every sub-key ORi(1 ≤
i ≤ r), the parities (i.e. the sum modulo 2) of all possible
combinations of k out of these M bits, listed by a certain
order, compose a new key O˜Ri . In fact, there are (Mk )
combinations of k out of M , so the length of each new
key O˜Ri is (Mk ), which is generally supposed to be equal
to the database’s capacity N .
(2) Shift-addition. To obtain the FOKOF , the above
r keys O˜Ri are combined bitwise with relative shifts si
Alice can freely choose, that is
OFj =
r⊕
i=1
O˜Rij+si , 1 ≤ j ≤ N, (11)
where OFj represents the j-th bit in O
F and O˜Rij+si is the
(j + si)-th bit in O˜
Ri .
The first step tries to reuse every bit in ROK to the
most degree so that M , i.e. the communication complex-
ity for each sub-key ORi , reaches the lowest value. But
obviously it will result in the amount of the bits Alice
knows in O˜Ri is more than expected. Therefore, the sec-
ond step is utilized to reduce Alice’s knowledge in the
final key. Because Alice can choose a shift for each O˜Ri ,
she will know at least 1 bit in the final key OF given
that she knows at least 1 bit in each O˜Ri . The feature of
shift-addition is that it can reduce Alice’s known bits in
the final key, while, at the same time, dose not increase
the failure probability (that is, Alice knows no bit in the
final key). Please sea Ref. [15] for details (the technique
of shift-addition was also discussed in Ref. [11]) .
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS ON THE
IMPROVED DILUTION METHODS
In all the three dilution methods the parity of k ROK
bits means a FOK bit. It is not difficult to see that in
the improved dilution methods, i.e. N − N and rM −
N ones, the bits in ROK are reused frequently so that
the communication complexity is greatly reduced. More
specifically, ROK with length N or even rM , instead
of the original kN , is enough for N -bit FOK. However,
as pointed by the authors of Ref. [15], the reduction in
communication complexity in their methods comes at the
cost that parity information about some key bits in FOK
is easier to obtain for Alice. Taking the N−N mothod as
our example, though Alice does not know their particular
values, Alice does know the parity of two adjacent FOK
bits OFi and O
F
i+1 if Alice knows two ROK bits O
R
i and
ORi+k (obviously O
F
i ⊕ OFi+1 = ORi ⊕ ORi+k). Similarly, if
Alice also knows ORi+1 and O
R
i+k+1 she knows the parity
of OFi+1 and O
F
i+2, and consequently knows all parities
of any two bits in the adjacent-bit set {OFi , OFi+1, OFi+2}.
Here we say such sets, like the above {OFi , OFi+1} and
{OFi , OFi+1, OFi+2}, are almost known (for Alice) because
in each of them Alice would know all of the bits if she
gets any one in it.
Now, the question is, what kind of influence this fact
(that is, the parity information were illegally leaked to Al-
ice) brings on the database’s security? Remember that,
in the database, every item, i.e. one-bit secret message
4mi, will be encrypted through O
F
i , getting the cipher-
text ci = mi ⊕ OFi , and then all the ciphertext bits
will be transmitted to Alice. Therefore, the message sets
such as {mi,mi+1} and {mi,mi+1,mi+2}, which corre-
spond to the above almost-known-final-key sets, are also
almost known for Alice. It implies Alice can illegally ob-
tain much more information about the secret messages in
database than expected. If only one query is considered
such information leakage seems trivial because Alice does
not know more explicit messages than expected. How-
ever, if Alice (or equivalent, Alice and some other users
who collude with her) executes multiple queries to Bob’s
database by buying multiple messages from him, the in-
fluence of this kind of information leakage will become
serious.
In fact, in each query, apart from obtaining 1 or little
more bits in FOK (equivalently, 1 or little more items
in the database), Alice would also get additional infor-
mation, that is, identifying some Almost Known Sets
(AKS) in the database. With the increasing amount of
the queries, such AKSs will become more and more, and
then some of them might be combined together generat-
ing a larger set (for example, a previous AKS {mi,mi+1}
and a new AKS {mi+1,mi+2} will be combined together
into a larger one {mi,mi+1,mi+2}, and previous two
AKSs {mi,mi+1} and {mi+2,mi+3,mi+4} will be linked
together by a new AKS {mi+1,mi+2}, becoming a larger
one {mi,mi+1,mi+2,mi+3,mi+4}). If Alice legally ob-
tains a bit in an AKS in one of the queries, all the items
in this set will be lighted, that is, all of them are explic-
itly known for Alice. It is not difficult to imagine that
after a certain number of queries Alice will obtain all the
database completely. That is to say, Alice might steal the
whole database, which is full of valuable secret messages,
by just buying limited items in it. Furthermore, Alice
can choose an optimal shift, i.e. the shift on the FOK
before encrypting the database, in each query so that she
can obtain the whole database with less queries.
Indeed, Alice can obtain the whole database by enough
queries (at most N) even though she does not utilize
the information brought by those AKS. The key point
is, would Alice, with the help of the illegal information,
achieve her goal greatly more quickly than expected?
The answer is yes. It means the leaked parity information
about some key bits in FOK results in serious insecurity
for Bob’s database.
A. Analysis on the N −N method
As described in Sec. I, Alice will know every ROK
bit with probability p = 1/4 if she is honest in the
J-protocol. While if she prepares a quantum memory
and executes individual unambiguous state discrimina-
tion (USD) measurement to attack, Alice can increase
this probability to p = 1− 1√
2
≈ 0.29 [11]. Then the prob-
ability of identifying a two-bit AKS such as {mi,mi+1}
is 1/16 and 3/2−√2 in the above two conditions respec-
tively. Now we do simulations for different parameters
to see how much information Alice will illegally obtain
from the leaked parity information, especially how many
queries are needed on average for Alice to obtain the
whole database.
In our simulation, the approach Alice chooses to attack
by multiple queries is as follows.
(S1) Define the parameters N, k, and p. Here N is the
total number of items in Bob’s database, the integer k is
a security parameter which is chosen so that the quantity
of Alice’s known bits in FOK c = N
4k
is little more than
1 and the failure (that is, no bit is obtained by Alice)
probability is small enough [15], and p equals to 0.25 or
0.29 for different attacks.
(S2) Simulate the first query. (I) Key generation. A
ROK with respect to N and p is generated. More con-
cretely, there are N bits in this key and Alice knows
every key bit with probability p. (II) Dilution. FOK is
obtained from the above ROK according to the N − N
method. The state of every FOK bit, i.e. known, un-
known, or almost known (equivalently, belonging to an
almost known set), is determined after this step. (III)
Record maintenance. Alice announces a shift s (0 ≤ s ≤
N−1), which can be selected at random here, so that Bob
encrypts the database via the shifted FOK and sends the
whole ciphertext to her. Then Alice records the state of
every item accordingly. Obviously, the items encrypted
via known (unknown) key bits are still know (unknown),
and the ones encrypted via an almost known key set still
compose an AKS.
(S3) Simulate another query. The first two steps (I)
and (II) are the same as that in (S2). (III) Record main-
tenance. Alice announce an optimal shift s (0 ≤ s ≤
N − 1) so that Bob encrypts the database via the shifted
FOK and sends the whole ciphertext to her. Here by opti-
mal we mean that when the shift is chosen the unknown
information about the database H = nu + naks is the
lowest, where nu is the total number of unknown items,
and naks is the total number of AKS after Alice received
the ciphertext encrypted via this FOK. Afterwards, Alice
updates the state of every item accordingly.
(S4) Repeat (S3) until all the items in Bob’s database
are explicitly known for Alice.
We perform simulations for three values of N , that is,
225, 1024, and 104, and both p = 0.25 and p = 0.29 are
executed for different N . For each situation the sim-
TABLE I. The DQA for different N . Here n represents the
expected amount of items Alice will get via one query.
N 225 1024 104
k 3 4 6
n = Npk (p = 0.25) 3.52 4.00 2.44
qd (p = 0.25) 18.6 30.4 53.4
n = Npk (p = 0.29) 5.49 7.24 5.95
qd (p = 0.29) 15.4 23.3 40.0
5ulation is done over 10 runs and the average amount
of queries (i.e. qd), which is needed for Alice to steal
the whole database, is obtained and shown in Table I.
Here we call qd the Death Query Amount (DQA). It
can be seen that the leakage of parity information in
N − N method seriously damages the security of Bob’s
database. For example, when N = 104 a dishonest Alice
can steal the whole database after only 53.4 (for p = 0.25)
queries on average. While, as is shown, the expected
amount of items Alice will get via one query is 2.44,
and consequently the DQA should have been at least
104/2.44 = 4098.4. Note that in this attack what Alice
needs to do is only legally performing multiple queries (or
equivalently, collecting data from other users who collude
with her), and this insecurity comes from the leakage of
parity information completely. If Alice executes a more
complex attack, e.g. using individual USD measurement
so that she can get any ROK bit with probability 0.29
instead of 0.25, the DQA would be further decreased to
40.0.
More concretely, three typical simulation instances for
N = 104, 1024, and 225 are shown in Figs. 1, 3, and 4, re-
spectively. From these figures we can see how the amount
of known or almost known items changes with respect to
the query count nq. Fig. 2 demonstrates how the theoret-
ical amount of unknown information about the database
changes in the instance N = 104. Besides, one may also
be interested in how many items Alice can explicitly ob-
tain after each query. To show that we also depict the
relation between the amount of explicitly known items
and nq. Obviously less queries (than DQA) might be
enough if Alice wants to know only part of the database
instead of the whole.
B. Analysis on the rM −N method
In the rM−N dilution method, Alice and Bob generate
an N -bit FOK by rM ROK bits. This method greatly
reduces the communication complexity compared with
the kN − N method (generally rM ≪ N). However,
the information entropy of such an N -bit FOK is rM at
maximum, which means this FOK is not strictly secure in
theory. Through analysis, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 1. In a QPQ protocol which employs the
rM −N dilution method, the user Alice can get the total
database by at most rM queries.
Proof. We start with the analysis on the structures of the
FOK OF generated by rM −N dilution method. If the
sub-key ORi (with length M), the extended sub-key O˜Ri
(with length N), and the FOK OF are seen as column
vectors, we can write the dilution method as
OF =
r⊕
i=1
O˜Ri(si) =
r⊕
i=1
G(si)O
Ri , (12)
where O˜Ri(si) represents the new key generated by per-
forming a relative shift si on O˜
Ri , and G(si) is an N×M
(a) nq=1 (b) nq=7 (c) nq=14
(d) nq=21 (e) nq=28 (f) nq=35
(g) nq=42 (h) nq=49 (i) nq=53
FIG. 1. A simulation instance for N = 104, k = 6, and p =
0.25, which is directly adapted from Ref. [15]. To identify all
the database items clearly, we draw a picture of the database,
where any item is represented by a square, and dye the known
items dark red, the unknown ones grey, and the AKS other
different light colors. Here nq is the present count of queries
and each sub-figure denotes the state of the whole database.
In this instance the DQA is 53.
H2
H1
NE, 2
NE, 1
10 20 30 40 50
nq
2000
4000
6000
8000
10 000
FIG. 2. The amount of unknown information about the
database, denoted by H , and that of explicitly known items,
denoted by NE , after each query for N = 10
4 and k = 6. The
red lines represent the result for an instance with p = 0.25,
i.e. the one shown in Fig. 1, and the blue lines denote the
result for an instance with p = 0.29. To obtain the whole
database, in the above two instances, Alice needs only 53 and
40 queries, respectively.
6(a) nq=1 (b) nq=7 (c) nq=13
(d) nq=19 (e) nq=25 (f) nq=30
FIG. 3. A simulation instance for N = 1024, k = 4, and
p = 0.25. In this instance the DQA is 30.
(a) nq=1 (b) nq=5 (c) nq=9
(d) nq=13 (e) nq=17 (f) nq=19
FIG. 4. A simulation instance for N = 225, k = 3, and
p = 0.25. In this instance the DQA is 19.
matrix. Obviously here G(si) includes both the sub-key-
extension operation and the key-shift operation. Accord-
ing to the processes described in subsection II C, we can
get that the row vectors of G(si) are N different M -
dimensional binary vectors, each contains k 1s andM−k
0s. Furthermore, different key-shift operations (that is,
different si) just implies different orders of the row vec-
tors in G(si) [17].
To give further analysis on the structures of OF , we
consider the equation
[
O˜R1(s1) O˜
R2(s2) · · · O˜Rr (sr)
]
=
[
G(s1) G(s2) · · · G(sr)
]


OR1
OR2
. . .
ORr

 .(13)
For simplicity, here we denote the above three matrices
as O˜s, Gs, and O
R
I respectively, and Eq. (13) can be
written in the form of O˜s = GsO
R
I . By rewriting the
first two matrices in the form of row vectors, Eq. (13)
can be expressed as

o1
o2
...
oN

 =


g1
g2
...
gN

ORI =


g1ORI
g2ORI
...
gNORI

 , (14)
where oj and gj (j ∈ [1, N ]) are row vectors. Suppose
the rank of Gs is T , then T ≤ rM since Gs is an N ×
rM matrix. Suppose {gγ1 , gγ2, . . . , gγT } is a maximally
linearly independent set of the row vectors of Gs, which
means any row vector of Gs can be expressed by these T
vectors, that is
gj =
T⊕
t=1
λj,tg
γt , ∀j ∈ [1, N ], (15)
where λj,t = 0, 1. Then for any j ∈ [1, N ] we have
oj = gjORI = (
T⊕
t=1
λj,tg
γt)ORI =
T⊕
t=1
λj,to
γt , (16)
and consequently we arrive at
OFj =
r⊕
i=1
oji =
r⊕
i=1
T⊕
t=1
λj,to
γt
i =
T⊕
t=1
λj,tO
F
γt
. (17)
Eqs. (16) and (17) imply that the T vectors {oγt |t ∈
[1, T ]} can linearly express all the row vectors in O˜s, and
OF is totally determined by the T bits {OFγt |t ∈ [1, T ]}.
Therefore, once Alice gets these T bits, she can figure out
the whole OF , and consequently obtain the whole database
by decrypting the ciphertext of the database encrypted by
the key OF . Here we call such a set of T OF bits, which
can determine the whole OF , a basis of OF . For example,
the above {OFγt |t ∈ [1, T ]} is a basis of OF .
Now we introduce Alice’s attack strategy where she can
get the total database by at most rM queries. Suppose
Bob’s database is bit string D = D1D2 . . . DN , where
each bit Dj (j ∈ [1, N ]) represents an item. The pro-
cesses of the attack is as follows.
1 Alice honestly executes the first query to Bob’s
database. Suppose the N × rM matrix, i.e. the
second one in Eq. (13), is G1s, the shifted FOK
is OF1 (s′1), where s
′
1 is the shift value Alice chose
to the FOK OF1 , and one of Alice’s known bits in
OF1 (s′1) is O
F1
γ1
(s′1) (i.e. the γ1-th bit in it). In
this query, Alice will receive a ciphertext of the
database C1, in which the j-th (j ∈ [1, N ]) bit is
C1j = Dj ⊕OF1j (s′1).
Afterwards, according to G1s and s
′
1, Alice calcu-
lates a basis of OF1(s′1) which contains O
F1
γ1
(s′1),
denoted as {OF1γt (s′1)|t ∈ [1, T ]}.
7t (t = 2, 3, . . . , T ) Alice executes the t-th query to
Bob’s database. Suppose the FOK in this round is
OFt and one of the bits known to Alice is the νt-th
one. Then she declares a shift value γt−νt, thus she
knows the γt-th bit in the shifted FOK O
Ft(γt−νt).
Consequently, she can calculate OF1γt (s
′
1) when she
receives the ciphertext of the database Ct.The rea-
son is as follows. The γt-th bit in the two cipher-
texts C1 and Ct are
Ctγt = Dγt ⊕OFtγt (γt − νt),
C1γt = Dγt ⊕OF1γt (s′1), (18)
so,
OF1γt (s
′
1) = C
t
γt
⊕ C1γt ⊕OFtγt (γt − νt). (19)
T+1 According to the T known bits {OF1γt (s′1)|t ∈ [1, T ]}
and the linear relationships determined by G1s and
s′1, Alice calculates all the other bits in O
F1(s′1) and
then the whole database D = C1 ⊕OF1(s′1).
In the above attack strategy, Alice gets the whole
database by only T queries, where T ≤ rM . Actu-
ally, Alice always needs less than T queries. On the
one hand, Alice may know more than one FOK bit in
each query. On the other hand, there are many differ-
ent bases of OF1(s′1), and she can choose the basis which
contains more known bits to reduce the total number of
queries.
IV. POST-PROCESSING OF THE OBLIVIOUS
KEY WITH ERROR CORRECTION
As we know, the major advantage of QKD-based QPQ
protocols is its practicability. In a practical realization,
however, noise exists in the channel and there are always
errors in the shared (raw) key between Alice and Bob.
Therefore, error correction is necessary for such proto-
cols. In fact, potential errors will seriously damage the
function of QPQ. An error bit in Alice’s FOK implies
that Alice would pay her money and get back a wrong
message from Bob, which is obviously unfair for Alice.
Moreover, Alice would think Bob is dishonest if she got a
wrong item, and Bob might cover his attack by channel
noise (not that Bob’s attack will inevitably result in giv-
ing a wrong message to Alice with a certain probability
[11], and he can excuse that it is a result of channel noise
when such error happens). But till now, as an open ques-
tion in QPQ listed by M. Jakobi et al [11], the method
of error correction in QKD-based QPQ protocols is still
missing, which greatly limits the practicability of them.
Actually, performing error correction on oblivious key
is difficult. On the one hand, Alice only knows part
of the oblivious key, which is quite different from that
of general communication or QKD. On the other hand,
to correct errors, additional two-way communication is
generally needed, which might affect the privacy of both
users. Furthermore, this kind of influence is difficult to
analyze [11]. Here, enlightened by the idea of one-way
error correction in QKD [18], we present an error correc-
tion manner for the oblivious key. Together with previous
kN −N dilution and the technique of shift-addition, we
actually give a complete post-procession algorithm for the
oblivious key in QPQ, including both dilution and error
correction. Furthermore, the influence of error correction
on the user’s privacy is analyzed.
As analyzed above, the improved dilution method, i.e.
N − N and rM − N ones, will result in the insecurity
of Bob’s database. So, let us go back to the original
kN − N method [11] to reduce Alice’s known bits, and
take the scenario where N = 105, k = 7, p = 0.25,
n = 6.10 and the failure probability P0 = (1 − pk)N =
0.002 as our example, which is directly adapted from
Ref. [11]. In this condition Alice and Bob share a
ROK OR = OR1 O
R
2 ...O
R
kN , with length kN , in the sense
that Bob knows all the key while Alice knows every bit
with probability p = 0.25. After the dilution, a FOK
OF = OF1 O
F
2 ...O
F
N , with length N , can be obtained ac-
cording to Eq.(1).
Consider one FOK bit OFi , which equals to the parity
of 7 ROK bits {ORi+jN (j = 0, 1, ..., 6)}. Suppose the error
rate of Alice’s ROK is e, that is, owing to the noise in
quantum channel, Alice’s every known bit in ROK differs
from Bob’s with probability e (it is reasonable to assume
that the error probabilities of {ORi+jN} are independent
because they come from different photons which are dis-
tant from each other). Similar to that in QKD, Alice and
Bob can estimate this error rate by publicly comparing
their key bits. For example, Bob announces part of his
ROK bits, Alice compares them with the corresponding
known ones in her ROK, and then declares the error rate.
Then, if there is no manner to correct errors, the error
probability of the FOK bit OFi is
pe =
∑
t=1,3,5,7
(7t )e
t(1− e)7−t, (20)
that is, the probability that odd errors happen in
{ORi+jN}.
In fact, the users can correct errors in ROK and ob-
tain FOK by the following steps. Note that here, for
simplicity, we still take the above example to describe
our method. That is, we only discuss how to correct er-
rors and get a FOK bit from 7 ROK bits {ORi+jN}. Other
ROK bits can be managed by the same manner.
(C1) Bob generates a message V containing 4 random
bits, i.e. V = V1V2V3V4, and encodes it into a 7-bit
codeword CW via a [7,4,3] linear error-correction code.
For example, the code has a generator matrix
G =


1 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 1

 , (21)
8and it encodes 0000, 0001, 0010, ..., 1111 into
0000000, 0001011, 0010110, 0011101
0100111, 0101100, 0110001, 0111010
1000101, 1001110, 1010011, 1011000
1100010, 1101001, 1110100, 1111111 (22)
respectively. This code has a minimum distance d = 3
and can correct 1 error among the 7 bits.
(C2) Bob encrypts the above 7-bit codeword CW , us-
ing {ORi+jN} as the key, via one-time pad, and sends the
ciphertext c to Alice.
(C3) This step can be divided into the following two
different conditions.
Condt.1 Alice knows all the 7 ROK bits {ORi+jN}. In
this condition, (I) Alice decrypts c, getting a 7-bit code-
word CW ′. (II) Alice corrects the possible error in CW ′,
obtaining CW . Obviously, if there are no more than 1 bit
error in {ORi+jN} Alice will obtain CW correctly. (III)
Alice takes the parity of 7 bits in CW as the FOK bit
OFi .
Condt.2 Alice does not know all the 7 ROK bits
{ORi+jN}. In this condition, Alice labels this FOK bit
unknown, i.e. OFi =?.
(C4) Bob also calculates the parity of 7 bits in CW to
obtain his corresponding FOK bit OFi .
By the above manner, Alice and Bob will finish their
dilution and error correction of the ROK after the man-
agement of all the 7N ROK bits, obtaining N -bit FOK
OF . It is not difficult to see that, by introducing the error
correction method, the error rate in FOK now becomes
p′e =
∑
t=3,5,7
(7t )e
t(1− e)7−t, (23)
that is, the probability that 3, 5, or 7 errors happen in
{ORi+jN}. Obviously this error rate is greatly lower than
the one without error correction, i.e. pe, when e is small.
And the failure probability, which implies Alice does not
obtain any FOK bit, remains unchanged, that is
P ′0 = P0 = (1 − pk)N = 0.002. (24)
Now we analyze the influence on users’ privacy the
above error correction brings.
Bob’s privacy. In the above example, to achieve the
function of error correction (i.e. to reduce the error rate
of the FOK bit OFi ), Alice has to know all 7 ROK bits
{ORi+jN}, which happens with probability p1 = p7. Ow-
ing to the utilization of the above [7,4,3] code, however,
Alice can deduce CW and then get OFi as long as she
knows no less than 4 bits among the 7 correctly. There-
fore, if Alice is dishonest and gives up the function of
error correction she will know every FOK bit with prob-
ability
p2 =
∑
t=4,5,6,7
(7t )p
t(1− p)7−t. (25)
Obviously, there is a huge gap between p1 and p2,
which greatly influences the database security. More con-
cretely, considering N = 105 and p = 0.25, the expected
amount of FOK bits known by an honest Alice equals
n1 = Np1 = 6.10, while that by a dishonest Alice is
n2 = Np2 = 7055.66. That is to say, if a dishonest Alice
gives up the function of error correction, where the er-
ror rate of her known FOK bits will be relatively higher,
she will obtain much more items in the database than
expected. An intuitionistic way to strengthen Bob’s pri-
vacy is choosing a greater k (k = 7 in the above example)
to reduce the value of n2. But it is useless because it will
greatly increase the failure probability P0 (i.e. that of
n1 = 0) for an honest Alice.
Now we must resolve this problem, that is, how to
eliminate the gap between p1 and p2, though it is quite
troublesome. Otherwise our above method for dilution
and error correction will be useless. Fortunately, there is
a manner, i.e. the technique of shift-addition (see subsec-
tion II C), to overcome this difficulty. Recall that shift-
addition has a good feature, that is, it can reduce Alice’s
known bits in the final key, while, at the same time, dose
not increase the failure probability. Therefore, we can
adapt this technique to deal with the oblivious key fur-
ther. In detail,
(D1) Alice and Bob share g ROK with length 7N via
QKD protocol such as SARG04. Here g is a parameter
and its value will be discussed later.
(D2) Alice and Bob perform dilution and error cor-
rection on every ROK respectively, obtaining g N -length
middle oblivious key (MOK) OMi{i = 1, 2, ..., g} as they
get FOK in steps (C1-C4).
(D3) To obtain the FOK OF , the above g MOKs are
combined bitwise with relative shifts si Alice can freely
choose, that is
OFj =
g⊕
i=1
OMij+si , 1 ≤ j ≤ N, (26)
where OFj represents the j-th bit in O
F , and OMij+si is the
(j + si)-th bit in O
Mi .
Actually, the technique of shift-addition decreases the
amount of FOK bits obtained by a dishonest Alice
through distributing multiple oblivious keys. It really
can resolve the above involved problem and render our
error correct method to take effect though the communi-
cation efficiency becomes lower.
Obviously, our post-processing is a gkN − N method
with error correction. After this procedure, the final error
rate in FOK OF is
p′′e =
∑
t=1,3,5...,t≤g
(gt )(p
′
e)
t(1 − p′e)g−t, (27)
that is, the probability that odd errors happen in the g
MOK bits (which will be combined into one FOK bit).
And the final failure probability is
P ′′0 = 1− (1− P ′0)g, (28)
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FIG. 5. The error rate of FOK. Here the line labeled by pe
is the error rate in kN −N method, and the other line p′′e is
that in our gkN −N method.
which means that at least one MOK is totally unknown
for Alice.
Now we discuss how to choose the value of g. In fact we
can perform simulations to determine g and the amount
of FOK bits known to a dishonest Alice, nA. For the
example here, i.e. N = 105, our simulation result is
given in Tab.II. It can be seen that g = 6 is reasonable.
In this condition nA = 5, which is already less than the
expected amount of known FOK bits for a honest Alice
in the original kN −N method, i.e. n¯ = 6.10. It should
be emphasized that greater g will bring less nA, which
implies higher database security, but it also results in
lower communication efficiency.
Fig. 5 depicts the comparison between the error rates
of FOK in the original kN−N method and in our gkN−
N one. It can be seen that when e < 30% the error rate
of FOK in our gkN−N method is visibly lower than that
in the original kN − N one, which implies the function
of error correct takes effect in our method. For example,
suppose e = 3%. An overall comparison between the
original kN −N method and our gkN −N one is given
in Tab. III. Obviously, by a tolerable sacrifice on the
failure probability (and communication efficiency), our
method can significantly decrease the error rate of the
final oblivious key.
Alice’s privacy. We believe that Alice’s privacy in
our gkN−N method is the same as the kN−N one. The
reasons are as follows. (1) Alice’s privacy in MOK in our
TABLE II. Simulation result for determining g (N = 105,
k = 7, p = 0.25). Here nA represents the amount of FOK bits
known by a dishonest Alice. Because nA remains unchanged
from g=12 to g=20, we do not continue the simulation for
g > 20. In this simulation, with the value of g increasing,
nA would decrease rapidly to around 5 though the dishonest
Alice has chosen an optimal shift si for every MOK to make
more bits survived.
g 1 2 3 4 5 6˜7 8˜11 12˜20
nA 7066 578 65 18 7 5 4 3
method is the same as that in FOK in kN−N one because
there is no difference for Bob to gather information on a
bit’s conclusiveness in the above two keys (note that our
error correction is executed in a one-way-communication
style). That is, knowing a conclusive bit in Alice’s MOK
implies no information on this bit’s value for Bob [11].
(2) Suppose finally Alice knows the ith bit in FOK in
our method. Because FOK is the combination of shifted
MOKs, to know Alice’s privacy, i.e. the index i, Bob has
to know a conclusive bit in at least one of the MOKs. But
if he obtains that Bob will totally loss the knowledge of
this bit’s value, and consequently not know the value of
the ith bit in FOK. This security for Alice’s privacy is
just the same as that in kN −N method.
Finally we emphasize the following two points about
our post-processing, especially the error correction in it.
(1) Note that here, for simplicity, we use the parity of
codeword as the FOK bit. To ensure the randomness of
FOK, the code must has balanced parity, that is, half
codewords have odd parity and the other half have even
one. Of course we can also choose a code which has not
balanced parity. In this condition, the parity of message
(that is, the four-bit one corresponding to every code-
word in our above example, e.g. 0000, 00001, 0010, ...,
1111) instead of codeword can be used as the FOK bit.
Obviously the parity of message is naturally random.
(2) In the description of our post-processing, a [7,4,3]
linear error-correction code is taken as our example. Of
course we can also choose other code according to the re-
quirement of error correction. For example, a code with
a minimum distance d=5 is needed if we want correct
any 1-bit and 2-bit error in the k ROK bits whose parity
will be a FOK bit. In our example, k happens to be 7,
and so the [7,4,3] code, in which the length of codewords
is 7, is suitable. One may argue that our error correction
may not work regularly if we want to use [7,4,3] code in
some scenario where k is not 7 (for example, as shown in
Ref. [11], when N = 104 a reasonable value of k is 6). In
fact it is unnecessary to worry about it. According to the
manner given in Ref. [13], any expected value of k can
be achieved for different N by adjusting the parameter θ.
Therefore, when we choose the code we only need to con-
TABLE III. An overall comparison between the kN −N dilu-
tion method and our gkN−N post-processing for the example
where N = 105, k = 7, p = 0.25, g = 6, and e = 3%. Here
the 2nd column represents the expected amount of FOK bits
which can be obtained by an honest Alice, and the 3rd one is
that for a dishonest Alice (note that by “dishonest” we mean
Alice tries to obtain more key bits by just giving up the func-
tion of error correction). The 4th column denotes the error
rate in the final oblivious key, and the 5th one is the failure
probability.
n¯-hon. n¯-dishon. error rate failure prob.
kN −N 6.10 - 0.1758 0.002
gkN −N 1 5 0.0008 0.013
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sider our requirement of error correction, and our post-
processing method is universal for different scenarios. Of
course, for the scenarios other than our above example
(i.e. N = 105, k = 7 and p = 0.25), the performances
of our post-processing, including the error rates before
and after the procedure, the user’s privacy, the failure
probability, and the value of g, should be re-analyzed by
similar manners.
V. CONCLUSIONS
From the proposing of BB84 QKD protocol [4], quan-
tum cryptography has drawn much attention of the schol-
ars in the world. Because of its success in the high secu-
rity in key distribution, people hope the security of var-
ious kinds of protocols in classical cryptography can be
overall upgraded by quantum manners. To this aim, dif-
ferent kinds of quantum protocols have been proposed,
including quantum secret sharing, quantum secure di-
rect communication, quantum digital signature, quan-
tum coin flipping, quantum bit commitment, and so on.
However, it seems that QKD is the most practical one
till now. Other quantum protocols tend to have differ-
ent shortages, e.g., failure in pursuing perfect security,
excessive complexity, fragility against channel noise, or
difficulty in realization. Therefore, in our opinion, it is
valuable to study what kind of cryptographic aims can be
achieved via QKD. It helps us to understand what kind
of innovation quantum mechanics can bring to cryptog-
raphy on earth. QKD-based QPQ is a good example for
that, and it may push this study forward.
Though different protocols have been given, the post-
processing of QKD-based QPQ is still unclear, which
greatly limits the practicability of those protocols. Here
we study the post-processing of the oblivious key in
QKD-based QPQ, including both parts in it, i.e. dilu-
tion and error correction.
On the one hand, we demonstrate that, though they
can significantly reduce communication complexity, the
previous N − N and rM − N dilution methods [15]
will result in insecurity in the sense that by multiple
queries Alice can obtain much more items (even the
whole database) than expected. For the N −N method
our simulation shows that when N = 104 the dishonest
Alice can steal the whole database after only 53.4 (for
p = 0.25) queries on average. While this number, called
the Death Query Amount (DQA), should have been at
least N/n¯ = 104/2.44 = 4098.4. If Alice executes a more
complex attack, e.g. using individual USD measurement,
the DQA would be further decreased to 40.0. For the
rM − N method we prove that Alice can get the total
database by at most rM queries.
On the other hand, we propose an effective error-
correction scheme for the oblivious key. Combined with
the previous kN − N dilution method, our error cor-
rection scheme completes the post-processing of oblivi-
ous key in this kind of QPQ protocols and makes them
more practical for a real noisy channel. By our post-
processing the error rate in the final oblivious key will
be significantly decreased by the sacrifice on communi-
cation efficiency. For example, in the scenario where
N = 105, k = 7, p = 0.25, e = 3%, the error rate af-
ter our post-processing is 0.0008 instead of 0.1758 in the
original kN −N method without error correction. And
at the same time, the user’s privacy is still properly pro-
tected.
Note. When this work was finished we found that
another error correction scheme for QPQ had been pro-
posed by P. Chan et al in Ref. [19].
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